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THE EU’S NEW BLACK SEA POLICY 
WHAT KIND OF REGIONALISM IS THIS? 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 297/JUNE 2008 
MICHAEL EMERSON
* 
1. Introduction 
On 1 January 2007, with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the European Union officially 
entered the Black Sea. Until that date, the EU institutions had been very reticent to express any 
interest in the Black Sea as a region of policy relevance. For example, earlier offers by the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organisation for the EU to become an observer there 
had not met any positive response.  
The European Commission had been thinking about it, but hesitation among various member 
states had discouraged any open initiative. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the 
issue could no longer be a question mark, given the obvious new legitimacy for the EU to take 
an active interest in the region, and the equally obvious demands by the two new member states 
for it to do so. As a result it took only a few months for the Commission to produce, in April 
2007, a policy document entitled “Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Initiative”.
1 
The title of this document and its contents bore a striking resemblance to a CEPS Policy Brief of 
June 2006 by Fabrizio Tassinari entitled A Synergy for Black Sea Regional Cooperation – 
Guidelines for an EU Initiative.
2 
The Commission’s Black Sea Synergy paper thus announced the opening of a new Black Sea 
policy for the EU. It follows the path of a familiar logic of action in response to the EU’s 
territorial enlargement, namely to construct a certain regionalism around the EU’s newly 
extended periphery. This had been seen already in three cases: to the south in the Mediterranean 
with the Barcelona Process, to the south-east with the Stability Pact for the Balkans, and to the 
north around the Baltic and Barents Seas under the name of the Northern Dimension.  
The Black Sea initiative will also add a multilateral regional dimension to the eastern branch of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which since 2004 had been entirely built around 
bilateral activity with Moldova, Ukraine and the three South Caucasus countries.  
But what is this policy going to look like in practice? Some answers began to emerge with the 
first major political event for the EU’s new Black Sea policy at a ministerial meeting held in 
Kyiv on 14 February 2008, to which the EU invited all Black Sea states, and which was hosted 
by Ukraine at the level of President Yushchenko.   
                                                      
* Michael Emerson is Associate Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS) and head of the EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policies research programme. He is the 
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New Black Sea Policy”, in Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott (eds), The Wider Black Sea Region in 
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Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., June 2008. The author is grateful to Fabrizio Tassinari for many 
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2. Typology  of  regionalisms 
At first sight there are quite a number of types of regionalism open for consideration in the case 
of the Black Sea. Box 1 lists no fewer than nine possible scenarios, which suggests already that 
there may be ambiguities, if not confusions and competing visions at stake.  
Box 1. Different possible species of Black Sea regionalism 
Technical regionalism: Objective criteria assign specific public policy functions to the territorial level 
that best encompasses their costs and benefits. 
Good neighbourliness regionalism: Neighbouring political jurisdictions organise congenial activities 
together with a view to building good relations and friendship.   
Security regionalism: Facing common threats such as illegal migration, trafficking of drugs and 
people, terrorism and strategic security generally. 
Eclectic regionalism: Experimenting with many conceivable types of regional cooperation, without a 
clear strategic view, or evident criteria for selection. 
Dysfunctional regionalism: Vain attempts to construct regional cooperation, frustrated by serious 
political divergences or inefficiencies between the participants. 
Institutional regionalism: Focus on the administrative and organisational structures devised to 
promote regional cooperation. 
Transformative regionalism: Regional cooperation as a means of working towards the 
‘Europeanisation’ of the region.  
Compensatory regionalism: A major bloc, in practice the EU, seeks to compensate outsiders 
immediately beyond its frontiers for the disadvantages of exclusion. 
Geo-political regionalism: Relating to the objectives of leading powers to secure a sphere of 
influence. 
The standard theory of federalism, or more broadly of multi-tier governance, assigns various 
public policy functions to the geographical level that optimally encompasses the costs and 
benefits of the policy in question. More precisely this is a search for solutions where there are 
major spillovers of costs and benefits beyond the territory of the given jurisdiction. Typically 
there will be under-provision of the policy where the benefits fall significantly outside the 
borders of the national territory, or where the costs would be borne disproportionately within a 
national jurisdiction. Regional cooperation above the level of the state can be a way of 
correcting for poor fits between the territory of government and the impact of the policy or 
problem. Seas enclosed by a number of different states provide some classic examples, notably 
in the cases of environmental pollution and fisheries. Without mechanisms to ensure 
cooperation to achieve common objectives, such as the preservation of water quality and fishing 
stocks, the individual state will not have a proper incentive to optimise policy or, the individual 
state cannot manage the problem alone without accepting a totally unreasonable burden of the 
costs, or even at any cost. These can be regarded as issues of technical regionalism, which can 
be entirely matters of efficiency of public policies at the regional level, where all parties can in 
principle have the same or similar objectives, and which may be effectively de-politicised.  
The region’s jurisdictions may also organise other de-politicised activities together for which 
there may be little or no technical need, but which can contribute to a spirit of mutual 
confidence and create bonds of friendship, maybe in spite of serious political differences and in 
order to limit or begin to overcome such differences. Examples include joint youth and sporting 
activities, groupings of local or regional officials for semi-social gatherings, or regional Rotary-
type clubs of professional people. We can call this good neighbourliness regionalism. THE EU’S NEW BLACK SEA POLICY | 3 
Common security threats of a cross-border nature, such as illegal migration and trafficking of 
drugs and people, and movements of terrorists, may also be viewed up to a point as needing 
regional cooperation technically. But these elements of security policy easily run into highly 
political matters of strategic security and geo-politics, and the forming of security communities 
or alliances, and so merit a separate term as security regionalism. At the present time there are 
two overriding security fears shared by all or most EU and Black Sea states: international 
radical Islamic terrorism and security of energy supplies. While the Black Sea region is not at 
the heart of the international terrorism scourge, Russia has had a strong interest in joining in the 
‘global war against terror’ logic of President Bush. The EU has its major concerns over 
terrorism too, but the Mediterranean is more relevant here than the Black Sea. The wider Black 
Sea-Caspian-Central Asian region is a major conduit for drug supplies, which is a shared 
concern for both Russia and the EU. However there are reports of serious collusion between 
corrupt government circles at high levels and drug mafia agents in the Caucasus, especially in 
Azerbaijan, which limits the scope for cooperation. Energy supply security is the strongest 
candidate as a core driver on the EU side, largely in association with the US, in order to counter 
the monopolistic practices and ambitions of the Russian energy and especially gas sector.
3 But 
here the EU’s interest to secure diversification of supply routes is in direct contradiction to 
Gazprom’s interest to secure its monopolistic position over gas supply networks. In short, the 
Black Sea now sees a complex overlay of projects that are cooperative for some participants 
while being competitive (or threatening, through increased Gazprom monopolisation) for others.  
Already we are collecting a variety of quite different regionalisms. The presence of several 
kinds of motivation may create a diffuse sense that some kind of regionalism needs to be 
organised, without it being clear at the outset quite what the priorities should be, especially 
where the region encompasses jurisdictions that have been politically divided for some time. 
The jurisdictions may come together and make a political declaration favouring their regional 
cooperation, and draw up lists of conceivable cooperative activities. This leads to a process of 
trial and error, or something of a bureaucratic Darwinian process, in order to sort out which 
activities prove viable. At the initial stage this may be called eclectic regionalism.  
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organisation has created a comprehensive 
institutional structure – ministerial councils, a permanent secretariat, working groups of senior 
officials and experts on sectoral topics, a development bank, a parliamentary assembly and a 
policy research institute. These structures were set up ahead of establishing real functions. This 
institutional regionalism may be viewed as a variant of the eclectic approach: i.e. set up a 
comprehensive institutional structure and wait for the Darwinian processes again to sort out the 
functions that prove themselves in practice from those that fail to take off. In fact the BSEC has 
so far seen only a weak overall performance, due to several factors, including the competition 
between the two leading regional powers, Russia and Turkey, through to the weak 
administrative capacities of many of the member states to organise significant cooperation, and 
the very limited financial resources made available to it. 
However these eclectic and institutional approaches may be viewed as masking more 
fundamental problems of incompatibility of objectives among the region’s actors. The grounds 
for scepticism are quite substantial. The Black Sea region is extremely heterogeneous 
politically, economically and culturally and in terms of the shapes and sizes of its countries. It is 
sometimes said that the Black Sea is a region with little in common except the sea that divides 
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it. Is the Black Sea to provide an example of dysfunctional regionalism? To be sure, there is 
political poison in the region stemming from the frozen conflicts, which involve every country 
of the region in one way or another. Relations between Russia, Ukraine and Moldova are 
troubled by the Transnistria conflict, between Russia and Georgia by the Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia conflict, and between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey by the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict. The EU for its part comes to the region with its own segmentation between four 
categories of states: the full member states (Bulgaria and Romania), the accession candidate 
state (Turkey), the ENP partner states (Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), 
and finally Russia as a would-be strategic partner. The EU’s primary policies towards each 
category are bilateral, and are driven by different Commission departments. To say the least, the 
pursuit of an effective Black Sea regionalism is going to be an uphill struggle.  
In a more positive interpretation of the EU’s interests in the region, the Black Sea initiative is a 
natural move to strengthen the ENP, which aims to bring a convergence of the whole region to 
the EU’s political values and economic structures, norms and standards – in short 
transformative Europeanisation. This paradigm may be viewed as involving not only specific 
policy reforms along the lines of EU laws, but also the transformation of the nature of national 
borders, diluting their significance and with them national identities in movements towards the 
post-modern state. The EU’s conception of regionalism at its periphery seems to represent the 
hope that the Europeanisation process may spill over its frontiers into the wider neighbourhood 
– at least to some degree even where the prospect of accession is not on the horizon.   
However the Black Sea region contains several countries – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
especially – that are deeply disappointed at not being granted a ‘membership perspective’ by the 
EU. A standard argument is that this lack of Europe’s mega-incentive for a transformative 
Europeanisation is a serious weakness of the European Neighbourhood Policy. A Black Sea 
initiative could be seen as seeking to bolster the ENP and to compensate in some degree for the 
disappointment of the Black Sea states aspiring to membership – compensatory regionalism for 
the excluded lying beyond the frontier.  
Finally there is the overarching question of how the Black Sea Synergy is intended to, or may 
actually affect the geo-political tendencies and tensions in the region – geopolitical regionalism. 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia feel that Russia is deploying overt or implicit strategies of 
political and economic pressurisation, and the Kremlin openly states its foreign policy priority 
to re-consolidate the CIS area. The US for its part is certainly perceived by Russia as adopting 
the contrary geo-political position, especially with respect to Georgia, which together with 
Ukraine, seeks NATO accession, or at least in the foreseeable future a membership action plan 
(MAP). In this situation the EU is certainly playing a softer game, but one that is not without 
subtlety and options. It can certainly present itself as a more neutral player.  
3.  An unofficial Black Sea Synergy proposal, June 2006 
The CEPS 2006 paper
4 took a position on the matters both of organisational and institutional 
structure, and the choice of priority sectors of policy considered most plausible for Black Sea 
cooperation. It drew on the EU’s prior experiences (the Northern Dimension initiated in 1999, 
the Barcelona Process in 1995 and the Balkan Stability Pact in 1999), which provided important 
references. All three were regional-multilateral responses to the EU’s own enlargement and/or 
the collapse of communism, be it Soviet or Yugoslav. All three initiatives were attempts to ease 
if not erase Europe’s post-world war divisions, or to soften its borders with its neighbours and 
so diminish the disadvantages of exclusion. The Barcelona Process was indirectly motivated by 
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these same concerns, since the southern EU member states were concerned that there should not 
be a swing in bias in the EU’s policies to the advantage of the north, given the opening of the 
EU for its enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of our typology of regionalisms, 
the broad objectives were somewhere in the range between the transformational and the 
compensatory. The Black Sea fits into this logic, and was only delayed as a result of the time 
lags in the enlargement to the Black Sea coast with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. 
There is an important difference in these three cases over whether the EU is coming into a pre-
existing structure, as in the Northern Dimension given the Baltic and Barents Sea councils that 
date back to 1992 and 1993 respectively, or is setting up an altogether new structure, as was the 
case with the Barcelona Process and the Stability Pact. In this respect the Black Sea is in the 
first category, given that the BSEC organisation was founded in 1992. To the south the 
Barcelona Process started de novo without any pre-existing regional organisation, and has 
remained without its own institutional structure. However this has created a lingering 
resentment with the South Mediterranean partner states over the lack of formal equality of the 
partnership. This will be corrected to some extent with the initiative of President Sarkozy, as a 
result of which the Barcelona Process will be re-baptised as the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’, 
with two co-chairs from the south of the EU and Southern Mediterranean states, and a small 
common secretariat. To the south-east, the Stability Pact also started de novo out of the need to 
fill a security vacuum after the Bosnian war.  
There is the further issue over whether the EU is the only major actor, or at least the clear prime 
mover. The Balkan Stability Pact was proposed by the then German EU presidency, but quickly 
became a project of the EU-US alliance, and co-opted into its structure all relevant international 
organisations (OSCE, UN agencies, NATO, World Bank, etc.). For the Barcelona Process the 
EU has acted on its own. In the Northern Dimension the objective was initially to secure 
cooperative relations with Russia alongside the prospect of the EU’s Baltic enlargement. 
Following the 1997 enlargement, the Northern Dimension has been reshaped, with only four full 
members: the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia. The Black Sea, analogous to the Northern 
Dimension, has its pre-existing BSEC structures, in which both Russia and Turkey have so far 
been the lead actors. 
The Black Sea could thus broadly fit into the pattern of the EU’s regionalism established in the 
three other cases, but it still has to determine whether to play the whole EU initiative through 
the pre-existing BSEC organisation, and how agreement might be reached with Russia and 
Turkey as the major players. The CEPS paper took the position in favour of ‘variable 
geometry’, i.e. allowing for different participation and organisational forms according to the 
sectoral policy domain, not to the exclusion of BSEC, but without granting it a general 
competence for the entire initiative. This is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Specific ‘partnerships’ 
were proposed for five sectoral priorities: environment, energy, transport, internal security and 
democracy. 
The choice of these five sectors marked the case for a limited number of priorities, with a strong 
emphasis on technical regionalism (environment, energy, transport), as opposed to the 
extremely dispersed efforts of BSEC. Each of these three domains has experienced significant 
prior EU activity in the Black Sea region, with different functional maps, for example with the 
environmental activity addressing the water quality of the Danube basin that stretches up into 
Austria and Central Europe, and the transport activity based on the EU’s priority corridors, 
which go west-east across the Black Sea region, but not around it.  
In two cases political considerations militated against using the BSEC as the institutional base: 
energy and democracy. The issues here relate to Russia’s strong positions: in the first case to 
maximise the monopolistic position and freedom of action of Gazprom, and in the second case 
to minimise democracy promotion activity of the ‘colour revolution’ variety. Since the BSEC 6 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
takes decisions by consensus, it would be a dumb move to play the EU’s very different interests 
in these questions through the BSEC.  
Figure 1. The variable geometries of the wider Black Sea region  
 
Source: Tassinari, op. cit. 
Figure 2. Framework of a Black Sea synergy  
 
Source: Tassinari, op. cit. 
                                                                                                                              
[CENTRAL                                                                                            Energy & 
EUROPE]                                                                                              Transport   
[RUSSIA & 
FSU Countries] 
 [ 
             Internal  
        [DANUBE] 
                    
Ei
 
 [BALTIC] 
 
 
   
 
Democracy    
BLACK SEA  
 
BLACK SEA FORUM  
Main Partners: 
BS and Caspian 
states; New 
GUAM; EU 
Commission: 
(DG TREN) and 
member states; 
the US; Banks; 
IFIs; UNECE; 
BSEC; private 
consortia  
Main Partners: 
BS and Caspian 
states; EU 
Commission (DG 
TREN) and 
member states; 
banks (EIB, 
EBRD); IFIs; 
OSCE; UNECE.    
Main Partners: 
BSEC member 
states; EU 
Commission (DG 
JLS) and member 
states; OSCE; 
Council of 
Europe; NATO; 
relevant UN 
agencies (IOM);  
US gov.; think-
tanks; Europol; 
Interpol.  
Main Partners:  
Black Sea and 
adjacent states; 
new GUAM;  
EU Commission 
(DG JLS) and 
member states; 
OSCE; Council 
of Europe; littoral 
states; NGOs; 
BSEC; US gov.; 
independent 
think-tanks.  
Energy 
Partnership 
Transport 
Partnership 
Internal Sec.
Partnership
Democracy 
Partnership 
Main Partners: 
Black Sea and 
Danube Commis-
sions; EU Com-
mission (DGs 
ENV and 
Fisheries) and 
member states; 
GEF-UNDP 
project; FAO; BS 
states; banks 
(EIB, EBRD); 
environmental 
NGO.  
     Baku  BSEC  CDC  Baku 
Process
DABLAS 
Environ.  
PartnershipTHE EU’S NEW BLACK SEA POLICY | 7 
Different formats for participation, organisation and funding could therefore be devised for each 
of the five sectoral ‘partnerships’. 
The CEPS study also advocated an overarching coordinating mechanism, justifying the synergy 
attribute. This was to be called the Black Sea Forum, and followed the experience of the Black 
Sea regional ministerial meeting convened by Romania in June 2006. This would not be an 
institution, but nonetheless a regular political event at which evolving priorities could be 
deliberated on by all BSEC member states and the EU, without it being an event controlled by 
BSEC.   
4.  The EU’s official Black Sea Synergy proposal, April 2007  
The European Commission’s Black Sea Synergy paper of April 2007 retained the ‘Synergy’ 
keyword in its title. However it also set out a long list of 13 topics that could be the subject of 
regional initiatives, contrary to the CEPS recommendation of a more limited and prioritised 
agenda. The Commission’s list is summarised here in the order of its Synergy document, with a 
few indications of the intended content under each heading: 
1.  Democracy, human rights and good governance, with support for regional initiatives 
underway, implying but without naming the Community of Democratic Choice, which has 
been a colour revolution support club  
2.  Security in relation to the movement of persons, notably illegal migration and transnational 
crime 
3.  A more active role through increased political involvement in the four frozen conflicts 
(Transnistria, Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh) 
4.  Energy supply diversification through investment in a new trans-Caspian trans-Black Sea 
corridor, implicitly to undermine Russia’s monopolistic position, and a possible common 
energy policy legal framework for the ENP countries 
5.  Transport corridors with support for a number of priority transport infrastructure axes 
already identified, and regulatory harmonisation in this sector 
6.  Environmental protection, with special reference to the Black Sea itself and the Danube 
basin flowing into it 
7.  Maritime policy, favouring a holistic approach aiming at safety of shipping, environmental 
protection and job creation in marine sectors and coastal regions 
8.  Fisheries, with new ways to be sought for sustainable use of fisheries resources 
9.  Trade policy, advocating that WTO membership be completed for those countries not yet 
there (Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan), and approximation of trade-related policies on EU 
standards, but with caution against regional free trade initiatives that might contradict the 
EU customs union 
10. Research and education networks, promoting enhanced ‘connectivity’ between systems and 
regulatory harmonisation 
11. Employment and social affairs, with vague advocacy of exchange of information on best 
practices, social dialogue and training 
12. Regional policy itself in the sense of extending Bulgaria and Romania’s new experiences in 
participating in the EU’s own programmes to enhance the competitiveness of coastal 
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13. Financial support can be made available under national, regional and cross-border 
programmes of the ENP’s budgetary grant instrument (ENPI), as well as through investment 
funding from the European Investment Bank and EBRD. 
The Commission’s proposals were thus highly eclectic, and amount to addressing all 
conceivable topics, with the exception of hard security and military affairs. It suggests that the 
EU is embarking upon an experimental period to see which sectors or approaches might develop 
significantly; indeed the bureaucratic Darwinian process of natural selection is already 
mentioned. Actually it sees almost every sectoral department of the Commission throwing in its 
own propositions over what it might do in the Black Sea. The Commission seems here to be 
flying on automatic pilot, and the controls have been locked onto the practice established over 
the last decade in negotiations over both enlargements, with neighbourhood policy as its weak 
derivative. This consists of taking up the chapters of the enlargement process for alignment of 
policies on the EU norms and standards. With the Commission working as a collegial body, new 
general policy initiatives will typically see an inter-service working group formed and the 
project coordinator, in this case the Directorate General for External Relations, has to preside 
over the production of the resulting policy document that meets with internal diplomatic 
consensus. 
Nonetheless there is a good fit in the order of implicit priorities, with five of the first six sectors 
coinciding with the CEPS recommendation. The addition proposed by the Commission is 
concern for conflict resolution in the region, which is surely a desirable objective. The EU’s 
involvement in attempted mediation efforts in the four ‘frozen conflicts’ (Transnistria, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh) has so far been very low profile. The main 
exception is in the case of Transnistria, where the EU has put in place a border monitoring 
mission and has joined the official negotiating table in its so-called 5+2 format. 
On the other hand, the list contains items of only weak plausibility for the EU’s involvement in 
Black Sea regionalism – for example employment and social affairs, and research and 
development.  
The proposal for trade policy relates of course to a strong EU competence. The EU has now 
embarked on a policy of negotiating ‘deep free trade’ agreements with all the Eastern 
neighbourhood states. These are the same Black Sea states, except for Russia which is also a 
laggard in trade policy, not even having acceded yet to the WTO. This naturally leads to the 
idea that at some stage there could be a multilateralisation of this set of free trade agreements, 
with common pan-European rules of origin for ‘diagonal cumulation’ already developed for the 
Euro-Mediterranean region, forming a Black Sea free trade area, with or without Russia.     
The proposal for an overarching maritime policy is extremely fuzzy at this stage. The concept is 
being promoted as a new EU policy domain for all of the seas that adjoin the EU, but it is far 
from firmly established operationally at the EU level, and so its regional applications also seem 
remote at the present time.  
On the wider political questions the Black Sea Synergy paper raised the possibility of either or 
both ministerial meetings with all BSEC member states (i.e. with Russia) or with just the ENP 
states (i.e. without Russia).  
The BSEC option – i.e. to develop Black Sea cooperation with all BSEC states including Russia 
– can be justified as the way to bring Russian foreign policy in the European theatre into a more 
cooperative mode. While Russia is formally outside the ENP, it has a bilateral programme with 
the EU for deepening four ‘common spaces’ in ways that bear some resemblance to the ENP 
action plans. The Black Sea Synergy would thus be bringing the EU closer together with both 
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with Russia now in the Baltic Sea region with the Northern Dimension cooperation, and would 
like the same to develop in the Black Sea. 
The ENP option – i.e. to develop Black Sea cooperation just with the ENP states without Russia 
– would be justified by the contrary political logic of developing the substance and credibility of 
this cooperation in part to induce Russia to re-evaluate its near abroad policy. Russia would see 
itself losing influence, and therefore in need of a pragmatic change of policy.  
The Commission proposed not to create new regional institutions, but expressed a willingness to 
take up an observer status in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organisation, while 
remaining open to the use of other regional bodies. It seems to be thinking along the lines of the 
CEPS paper, namely to establish a number of specific partnerships for each priority sector. 
5.  The first EU-Black Sea ministerial meeting, February 2008 
The ministerial event of 14 February 2008 was in fact quite revealing on a number of these 
issues. A first seeming curiosity was the publication of two versions of the conclusions, both of 
which are annexed at the end of this paper. The first set of conclusions was published by the 
BSEC member states alone, and the second set contain the jointly negotiated conclusions of the 
BSEC member states and the EU. While at first sight, these two documents have a substantial 
degree of overlap, they are interesting for both their commonalities and differences, and so both 
are worth documenting alongside each other. 
The institutional question was highlighted by the fact that there were actually two ministerial 
meetings on February 14
th, not one. At the first and shorter meeting, the EU troika (Presidency 
and Commission) joined in a meeting of the BSEC ministers, the latter gathered together in their 
BSEC capacity. The BSEC ministers adopted a declaration “on a BSEC-EU enhanced 
relationship”. The second and longer meeting resulted in a joint statement under the authority of 
“the ministers of foreign affairs of the countries of the European Union and of the wider Black 
Sea area”. 
At play here was the question of the degree to which the EU’s Black Sea Synergy would be 
articulated through the BSEC organisation, or whether BSEC would be just one of the possible 
institutional arrangements to be used. On the BSEC side, Russia and Turkey were seeking to 
maximise the use of the BSEC organisation. It may be speculated that the motivations here are 
somewhat different. For Russia the consensus decision-making rule of BSEC was attractive as 
an instrument for retaining control over the EU’s insertion into the Black Sea process. Turkey 
was perhaps more motivated by its pride of ownership of the BSEC, having been its political 
initiator, and with Istanbul the location of its headquarters. On the EU side, many member states 
are wary of granting too big a role to BSEC, and certainly not a monopoly position, for reasons 
counter to Russia’s motivation.   
So a compromise was reached, with the first shorter meeting taking place within a BSEC 
framework, and the second one referring in its title just to the “wider Black Sea area”. The 
Russian position has actually moved considerably since the time it was basically against the 
EU’s insertion into the BSEC in any way – such was the position adopted by Russia at some 
earlier BSEC meetings. When faced with the impossibility of halting the EU’s entry into the 
Black Sea, its second position was then to try to confine it to BSEC decision-making to the 
maximum degree possible. The outcome on February 14
th with the two meetings seems to have 
been a rather weak rearguard action by Russia in response to this situation. 
These February 14
th meetings thus provided some answers to two of the questions we posed 
earlier. The EU has entered into a Black Sea process with Russia, rather than just with the ENP 
states; and the process includes the BSEC, but without a monopoly position.  10 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
For future such events, there could be changes in format on the EU side. This first Black Sea 
event brought together all 27 member states,
5 which is a very heavy format for an important but 
not top-priority topic. Elsewhere the EU develops lighter formats, notably in the case of the 
Northern Dimension, which has invented the so-called ‘open troika’ method, where the EU is 
represented by the Presidency and Commission, plus on an optional basis those member states 
that feel seriously interested. This format will be further simplified when the Treaty of Lisbon 
enters into force, with merger of the Presidency and Commission (through double-hatting of the 
High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission). 
The texts of the two concluding documents further underline the different institutional 
preferences. The unilateral BSEC declaration is first of all strong on the achievements of BSEC 
and goes on to stress that the EU-BSEC relationship should be comprehensive and inclusive, 
avoid duplication, and be further institutionalised with an ‘enhanced BSEC-EU relationship’ to 
include ministerial meetings in different formats (i.e. ministers of various sectoral policy 
domains). The EU-BSEC relationship does in fact broaden out, with the European Commission 
now taking up the role of observer in several BSEC working groups (transport, environment, 
research).  
However, while the joint statement of the ministers of the EU and wider Black Sea area (see 
below) recognises the important role to be played by BSEC, but also notes that “the Black Sea 
Synergy will at the same time remain open to all appropriate cooperation possibilities provided 
by other regional bodies and initiatives” (i.e. the ‘Black Sea Synergy’ here standing for the EU 
policy). There is reference also to the Black Sea Synergy benefiting from the formation of 
“Black Sea partnerships involving various stakeholders from the EU and wider Black Sea area”, 
which, more concretely, can mean the creation of operational trust funds such as those already 
in operation in the Northern Dimension.  
The priority sectors mentioned in the two documents contain both substantial common ground 
and some significant differences. The list of identified sectors is shorter in the BSEC document, 
partly because the BSEC is basically an economic organisation, to the exclusion of purely 
political issues; whereas for the EU the Black Sea Synergy is definitely also intended to be 
political. The BSEC document thus identifies transport, energy security, environment, crime, 
terrorism, disaster relief, information technologies, and the movement of people and the creation 
of clusters. The joint statement also covers all these domains (except passing over the 
‘clusters’), but also addresses questions of democracy, human rights, civil society, conflict 
resolution and parliamentary activities. These latter political activities will of course fit more 
easily with the GUAM and Community of Democratic Choice initiatives, of which Georgia and 
Ukraine are the keenest advocates, whereas Russia regards these as dangerous instruments for 
the spread of ‘colour revolutions’.   
The last substantive paragraph of the joint statement is most positive: “Participants considered 
that this Black Sea Synergy meeting is the beginning of a long-term regional cooperation 
endeavour offering new opportunities and increased stability to citizens of the Black Sea area 
and the whole of Europe”.  
The next stage in the process was in June 2008, when the Commission presented to the Council 
a report on progress to date, with indications of how the various lines of concrete activity will be 
followed up. These conclusions highlighted the following: 
                                                      
5 The EU member states were represented by 5 foreign ministers, 14 deputy foreign ministers and 8 
ambassadors, whereas the 8 non-EU Black Sea states were represented by 6 foreign ministers and 2 
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Long-term, measurable objectives in fields like transport, environment, energy or 
maritime safety should be set to spur more concerted action. These would require the 
support of all BSS members. In each case a lead country and/or organisation should be 
identified to ensure coordination of activities which might be undertaken at national or 
regional level to achieve the objectives set. 
To facilitate the realisation of projects, sectoral partnerships could be established to 
provide a framework for co-financing (including through the NIF) and a basis for the 
involvement of IFIs. These partnerships might bring together all or some of the Black 
Sea Synergy participants to cooperate on a series of projects. The successful experience 
of the Northern Dimension provides a useful example of how this could work. 
The frequency of ministers’ meetings should reflect concrete needs. In some cases they 
could take place in the existing sectoral frameworks (such as TRACECA or the Baku 
Initiative) or could follow the Kyiv model (back-to-back with BSEC meetings, with 
full EU participation or involving an open troika). Foreign ministers could meet as 
required to mark the major milestones of the process.
6 
6. Conclusions 
Overall one can register that the EU has taken significant steps towards constructing a new 
Black Sea dimension to its neighbourhood policies in the wake of the EU’s enlargement to the 
Black Sea region with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007. The act of 
enlargement was promptly followed in April 2007 by the Commission’s ‘Black Sea Synergy’ 
proposal, which was readily endorsed by EU foreign ministers and then at the top level by the 
European Council. This has now begun to be operationalised at the wider Black Sea level with 
the first ministerial meeting in Kyiv in February 2008, which set fairly clear guidelines for the 
next steps.  
In the course of this meeting, several key questions surrounding the possible political character 
of the initiative began to be answered. A certain dialectic process between the EU and Russia 
was played out. First Russia was invited to the ministerial meeting and accepted to participate, 
thus averting the alternative scenario under which the EU’s initiative might have proceeded only 
with ENP countries. But secondly Russia’s wish to tie the EU’s presence in the region 
predominantly into the BSEC organisation for reasons of political control was declined by the 
EU, which is now an observer of BSEC without granting this body any monopoly. Russia has 
had to go along with this, and the joint statement of the Kyiv meeting envisages activity on 
purely political issues outside BSEC, and with the EU retaining freedom to use any appropriate 
regional body or arrangement. 
More broadly this beginning of a Black Sea dimension to the EU’s neighbourhood policies fills 
an obvious gap in the EU’s vision of the map of wider Europe. The EU is moving towards a 
certain degree of commonality in its approaches to each of the three enclosed seas of its 
periphery – the Baltic, the Mediterranean and now the Black Sea. While the political profiles of 
these maritime regions are of course very different, they naturally give rise to many common 
policy challenges, including those issues that are based on non-political matters of regional 
maritime geography. However the EU seems to be principally motivated in seeing all regions in 
its neighbourhood integrating as far as possible with its economy and converging on its political 
norms. How far this can succeed through neighbourhood policies that do not comprise a further 
widening of the enlargement process is still an unanswered question. 
                                                      
6 European Commission, Report on the First Year of Implementation of the Black Sea Synergy, 
COM(2008)391 final, 19 June 2008. 12 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
Can we offer an answer to our own question about where the EU’s Black Sea Synergy is going 
to find its main place in the typology of regionalisms, as set out at the beginning? While the 
Commission’s initial proposals were highly ‘eclectic’, the Kyiv ministerial meeting did produce 
some useful prioritisation. There is certainly going to be a significant amount of ‘technical 
regionalism’ combined with ‘security regionalism’. There is already in evidence a gentle 
diplomatic ballet between the EU and Russia, with the EU resisting Russia’s pursuit of its own 
‘geopolitical regionalism’. The EU would like in theory to see its efforts lead to a 
‘transformative regionalism’, but the lack of agreement so far over further extending 
membership perspectives to countries of the region risks the outcome being placed more in the 
category of ‘compensatory regionalism’. 
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Declaration 
 
of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states of the Organization of the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation on a BSEC-EU enhanced relationship 
 
Special Meeting of the BSEC Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Kyiv, 14 February 2008 
 
We, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the Organization of the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) – the Republic of Albania, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic 
of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Bulgaria, Georgia, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of 
Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Turkey and 
Ukraine – met in Kyiv, on 14 February 2008. We discussed the perspectives for the development 
of a mutually beneficial cooperation between BSEC and the EU, respecting the interests of both 
sides. 
Taking guidance from the political assessments and executive dispositions of the Declaration 
adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the BSEC Member States on the occasion of 
the BSEC Fifteenth Anniversary Summit held in Istanbul, on 25 June 2007, we reaffirm our 
commitment to the Organization and its Charter as an indispensable foundation for peace, 
stability, security and prosperity in the wider Black Sea area. 
We consider BSEC-EU interaction as an integral part of overall European economic, scientific 
and environmental cooperation. Our aim is to achieve proper synergies by coordinating the efforts 
with various integration and cooperation formats, international organizations and institutions, in 
particular financial ones, acting in the BSEC area. 
BSEC is an inclusive, treaty-based, full-fledged, project oriented regional economic organization, 
possessing mature institutional structures, well established operational rules and procedures. We 
all share the conviction that our multilateral economic cooperation contributes to enhancing 
peace, stability, security and prosperity to the benefit of our region. The Organization has also 
contributed to developing a sense of regional ownership and identity among our peoples. We are 
committed to further consolidate its role as an active and reliable partner in international and 
regional affairs. 
We believe that the earliest peaceful settlement of the existing protracted conflicts in the BSEC 
region, on the basis of the norms and principles of international law will contribute to the 
enhancement of regional cooperation. 
The BSEC-EU interaction is a forward-looking and promising framework, which can contribute 
to shaping the foundations of an enhanced regional relationship. 
BSEC continues to be committed to develop new legal instruments and mechanisms for 
multilateral economic cooperation in a regional format, which can effectively benefit the citizens 
of the area. 
We believe that interaction between BSEC and the EU should further be institutionalized and 
result-oriented, through the identification of common tools and the development of synergies. It is 
necessary to undertake joint efforts to support development and cooperation in the wider Black 
Sea area, through various cooperation programmes and partnerships. 
We also believe that the joint BSEC-EU action in the wider Black Sea area should be 
comprehensive and inclusive, so that its benefits encompass all BSEC Member States. 
BSEC is looking for closer cooperation and coordination with the EU in the areas of mutual 
interest, ensuring complementarity, synergies and avoiding duplication of work. 14 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
We also express the wish to establish a BSEC-EU enhanced relationship, within which Ministerial 
Meetings in different formats could be held. 
We invite the EU to join the efforts of BSEC in particular in the priority areas of the development 
and interconnection of transport infrastructure in the region (Black Sea Ring Highway and 
development of the Motorways of the Sea of the BSEC region), in enhancing energy security and 
environmental sustainability in the region, in combating all forms of organized crime, terrorism, 
in preventing and managing natural and man-made disasters, in upgrading communication and 
information technologies in the region and in facilitating the movement of peoples, including 
representatives of the business communities and lorry drivers, between the EU and BSEC 
countries. BSEC is interested in using the EU experience in promoting regional cooperation inter 
alia through the creation of clusters with the view to unite efforts of industry, universities and 
research centres. With this aim, BSEC suggests to develop together with the EU a respective 
“road map” for cooperation and establish special ad hoc joint working groups for practical 
implementation. BSEC is also interested in starting talks at an expert level, to identify means and 
ways of cooperation in the areas of common interest. 
We express our gratitude to the Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the people of 
Ukraine for the warm hospitality and the excellent organization of this important Meeting, held 
back-to-back with the Ministerial Meeting for launching the Black Sea Synergy process. 
 
 
Joint Statement 
 
of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries of the European Union and of the wider 
Black Sea area 
 
1. Foreign Ministers of the countries of the European Union and of the wider Black Sea area met 
in Kyiv to initiate the Black Sea Synergy cooperation. The Meeting was opened by H.E. Viktor 
Yushchenko, President of Ukraine. 
2. Ministers identified significant challenges and opportunities in the wider Black Sea area, which 
may require coordinated action at the regional level. They agreed that greater involvement by the 
European Union can increase the potential of Black Sea regional cooperation. Ministers 
welcomed the Black Sea Synergy Initiative of the European Union as an important tool to achieve 
this goal. 
3. Participants agreed that the primary task of the Black Sea Synergy is the development of 
cooperation within the Black Sea region and also between the region as a whole and the European 
Union. The different aspects of the Synergy will be discussed, agreed upon and implemented by 
the interested countries in a fully transparent and flexible manner, based on mutual interests.  
4. The Black Sea Synergy will benefit from the European Neighbourhood Policy and other EU 
policies applied in the relationship with countries of the region. EU support to Black Sea regional 
cooperation is aimed at producing tangible results in a number of priority areas. This includes the 
development and interconnection of transport, energy and communication infrastructure, 
responding to increasing trade, investment, traffic and information flows as well as rapidly 
evolving transit needs. Ministers declared their intention to promote the dialogue between energy 
producers, consumers and transit countries aimed at ensuring fair access to energy resources and 
markets, enhancing energy security and environmental sustainability. They will support regional 
transport cooperation with a view to improving efficiency, safety and security. Ministers agreed 
that the Black Sea Synergy offers a framework to improve coordination between relevant EU and 
regional policies as well as wide-ranging programmes such as the development of major trans-
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5. The Synergy should contribute to better coordinating specific environmental programmes, 
notably those focusing on tasks relating to water quality. It should also invigorate the dialogue on 
Black Sea maritime policies and facilitate efforts to establish regional fisheries management 
cooperation in order to ensure sustainable use of Black Sea fishery resources. Black Sea regional 
cooperation should also provide a framework for building capabilities to cooperate in combating 
climate change and in preventing and managing natural and man-made disasters in the region. 
Black Sea countries and the European Union will develop region-wide activities to strengthen 
cooperation in the fields of migration, law enforcement and the fight against organised crime 
building on the activities of cooperation arrangements already in place, by ensuring added value 
and avoiding duplication.  Increased EU engagement in Black Sea regional cooperation has the 
potential to bring benefits also in the fields of trade, science and technology, research, culture and 
education as well as employment and social affairs. 
6. Ministers took note of the wish for a possible visa facilitation perspective and the role of 
enhanced mobility in promoting the development of trade and economic relations.  
7. The Black Sea Synergy could benefit from Black Sea partnerships, involving various 
stakeholders from the EU and the wider Black Sea area.  
8. Participants agreed that the Black Sea Synergy would be a useful means to strengthen the 
democracy and respect for human rights and to foster civil society.  
9. Protracted conflicts impede cooperation activities. Therefore participants emphasized the need 
for their earliest peaceful settlement on the basis of the norms and principles of international law. 
10. The Meeting took due regard of the importance of parliamentary activities in promoting 
regional cooperation. 
11. Ministers welcomed the first steps of the Black Sea Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 
which supports civil society and local level cooperation in Black Sea coastal areas. 
12. Participants stressed the need for proper funding of priority regional cooperation programmes. 
Co-financing should apply as a general rule. In this context, the regional activities of the 
International Financial Institutions, most notably the EBRD, the EIB and the BSTDB, could offer 
new possibilities along with financing coming from the EU and from countries of the Black Sea 
area. 
13. The Ministers recognised the important role played by regional organisations and initiatives, 
particularly by the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Ministers noted 
with satisfaction that the European Commission has obtained observer status in BSEC and has 
engaged in practical interaction with it in several fields. Black Sea Synergy will take due account 
of the work in BSEC and will at the same time remain open to all appropriate cooperation 
possibilities provided by other regional bodies and initiatives, including those in the Danube 
region, a key area to strengthen connections between the EU and the Black Sea countries. 
14. Participants considered that this Black Sea Synergy Meeting is the beginning of a long-term 
regional cooperation endeavour offering new opportunities and increased stability and prosperity 
to citizens in the wider Black Sea area and the whole of Europe. 
Ministers expressed their gratitude to Ukraine for the excellent preparation and organisation of the 
Meeting. 
Kyiv, 14 February 2008 
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